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Abstract  
Context and Research questions 
The proposed paper deals with platform emergence in double unknown situations when 
technology and markets are highly uncertain. The interest in technological platform 
development to enable creation of products and processes that support present and future 
development of multiple options is widely recognised by practitioners and academics (Gawer 
2009, Baldwin 2008, Baldwin and Clark 1997, Meyer and Utterback 1993, etc). The existing 
literature considers already existing platforms and the development is based on exploiting this 
common platform core to build future markets and technological derivatives. However, when 
we are in double unknown situations, markets and technologies are highly uncertain and 
neither options, nor platform core are known. Thus, how can one ensure platform emergence 
in double unknown?  
The first identified in the literature strategy consists of progressive emergence of common 
core. Generally this leads first to conduct exploration projects to create new knowledge and 
formulate platform and second, to reuse identified platform to construct platform derivatives 
(series of projects generate the technology platform with associated derivates) (Sanderson and 
Uzumeri 1995, Loch et al., 2006). This strategy is based on singular challenge exploration for 
identified market and its potential reuse as a platform core after (Singular challenge platform 
emergence strategy). In addition, there is a possibility to develop first the technology that is 
more critical (technological lock-in) for several identified markets (platform derivatives) 
(Kokshagina et al. 2012). The strategy leads to identify common challenge relevant to several 
market derivatives and design common core that addresses all these alternatives (common 
challenge strategy). 
The history of innovation promotes mostly singular challenge strategy to guide innovative 
development. But in certain sectors, like semiconductors, telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals, the success of common challenge strategy applicable to several markets is 
more important than singular project success. Thus, which strategy to choose for innovative 
technological platform emergence?  
Why common challenge strategy appears to be so challenging and risky? Why do we usually 
prefer to conduct project exploration to emerge common core instead of constructing future 
platform directly? What are the obstacles and advantages of each strategy? And which 
conditions one has to follow to choose one of them in organizing exploration activity? The 
objective of the paper is to define what are the precise market and technological conditions 
that in certain situations lead to 1) develop common building block (common core) that 
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facilitate all the others projects but don’t provide access directly to the market 2) launch 
singular project exploration to emerge future platform core consequently. 
Methodology. We attempt to address our research questions by formally describing each 
strategy and fabricating simple economical model to compare them. For simulation the data 
was created by taking into account specifics of real management situations and parameters 
were chosen based on the literature review. Then we illustrate the insights of the model 
through a case study of innovative technology development in semiconductor industry. The 
in-depth empirical case study was conducted in STMicroelectronics (STM), one of the leaders 
of the semiconductor industry. The data for case study was gathered from advanced 
technology platform with several interdependent modules developed by company and 
introduced to the several markets after all. The source of information was regular and frequent 
semi-structured interviews with specialists participating or leading technology development 
from R&D and business units and projects documentation.  
 
Results and managerial implications.  
This paper contributes to existing work on platform emergence by introducing the strategy of 
platform core construction in double unknown based on future common challenge 
investigation. To investigate the question of market and technology conditions of each 
strategy implementation, we formulate a model to formally describe risk management 
strategies for platform emergence. Thanks to this model we introduce technology and market 
compatibility rules that highlight the situations when common challenge strategy is possible. 
We illustrate both strategies on the case of advanced technology development in 
semiconductor industry and highlight the limits of each strategy. We show that the common 
challenge strategy aims at knowledge creation, attempts to keep cost under control of R&D 
budget, while maximizing the likelihood of being relevant for future markets. In addition, our 
study shows that the strategy of singular challenge project development for platform core 
emergence depends on the context of the first project context. There is a negative effect that 
the results of project exploration can fail to decrease uncertainties relevant to other options.  
This work suggests managerial implications of strengthening the collaboration in between 
Technology R&D and markets divisions. This collaboration will allow the construction of 
flexible common challenges and enhance the value of common core relative to future market 
derivatives. However, the common challenge emergence has to be done in the earlier phases 
of technology exploration and markets emergence (breakthrough innovations) to avoid too 
many constraints added by each market derivatives.  
Finally, using originally new way of risk management based on knowledge gap identification 
to construct common unknown core, company can build its innovative capabilities through 
knowledge management and better position to innovate in emerging fields.  
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Introduction 
Innovative technological development requires capital investment in its R&D. Yet, the R&D 
outcomes normally take years to be realized and the economic return is highly uncertain. In 
this uncertain environment project selection, choice of the key technologies for the firm in 
upcoming years, the management of R&D are of crucial importance for high-tech companies. 
Therefore a lot of scholars and practitioners seek for tools to allow mitigating uncertainties 
and maximizing profit of future products in these breakthrough situations. The existing 
literature indicates the interest in developing technological platform to enable creation of 
products and processes that support present and future development of multiple modules 
(Gawer 2009, Baldwin, 2008, Baldwin and Clark 1997, Gawer and Cusumano 2008, etc.)). 
This strategy appears to be robust for new product development, manufacturing and 
distribution. According to (Sanchez 1996) concepts of modularity in products and 
organizations are the core concepts driving the new kinds of product strategies emerging in 
dynamic product markets. Historical stories of IBM technological platform development 
(Gawer and Cusumano 2008), Black&Decker power tools (Meyer and Utterback 1993) and 
many other examples show the relevance of platform strategies in practise. Usually, the 
platform is considered to be known and the development is based on exploiting this common 
core to build future modules. However, when we are in double unknown situations, markets 
and technologies are highly uncertain and neither options, nor platform core are known. There 
is a possibility to decrease uncertainties by launching exploration projects for identified 
potential market and manage risks at the level of single projects. But the preference of high-
tech industries like pharmaceuticals, semiconductors is to develop technologies relevant to 
several markets. Thus, how can one ensure platform emergence in double unknown? 
The first identified strategy consists in progressively emerging the common core. Generally 
this leads first to conduct exploration projects to create new knowledge and formulate 
platform. Second, reuse identified platform to construct platform derivatives (series of 
projects generate the technology platform with associated derivates) (Sanderson and Uzumeri 
1995). This strategy has to take into account risks of the chosen exploration project at the 
beginning and consequently risks of portfolio once it is constructed. Finally, there could be a 
possibility to develop first the technology that is more critical (technological lock-in) for 
several markets (platform derivatives) and then address the options. This strategy doesn’t 
obtain common core as a result of exploration, but directly working with common challenge 
as an object to conceive and manage (Kokshagina et al. 2012).  
So platform emergence can lead first to exploration project emergence to fabricate platform or 
direct platform emergence to identified options. In the first strategy, at the beginning singular 
project is launched to find a solution to common singular challenge and after to formulate the 
common core for future options. The project is explored first and then the common to several 
market options is deduced based on it. In the second strategy, we formulate the common by 
identifying what is common to several options before trying any of them. But in the second 
case the common is not necessary an existing one – it is common challenge to several 
potential markets. We will call the first strategy “Singular Challenge” (SP) and the second – 
“Common challenge” (SC). Previous work described these strategies based on identified 
managerial framework with objects, actors, criteria and necessary resources (Kokshagina et 
al., 2012). Still, even if highlighting major differences in between strategies, their economical 
conditions are not explicitly addressed. It is not obvious which strategy to choose in each 
situation (research gap).  
The history of innovation promotes mostly singular challenge strategy to guide innovative 
development. But in certain sectors like semiconductors we state that the common challenge 
The R&D Management Conference 2012 
 4 
is more important than singular project success. There are companies like Intel, 
STMicroelectronics, etc. that were able to propose solutions for common challenges before 
having developed any markets and then introducing products based on this common core to 
all the identified markets. 
Thus, why common challenge strategy to appears to be so challenging? Why do we usually 
prefer to conduct project exploration to emerge common core instead of constructing future 
common ground directly? What are the obstacles and advantages of each strategy? And which 
conditions one has to follow to choose one of them in organizing exploration activity? The 
objective of the paper is to define what are the precise market and technological conditions 
that in certain situations lead to 1) develop common building block (common core) that makes 
accessible all the others options but don’t provide access directly to the market 2) launch 
singular project exploration to emerge future platform core. 
Generally for common challenge strategy there are a lot of constraints and it is considered to 
have little chance to succeed. Among them: 
1. Capability to identify potential markets without adding too much constraints to the 
common core formulation 
2. High cost of adaptation for future derivatives 
3. Competence to identify common challenge in high uncertainty. 
As all the markets are quite contrasted (different domains, criteria, etc.), usually there are high 
costs of adaptation for each option. Thus, we have a tendency to look for platform that 
reunites maximum functions in between different options and probability of finding common 
core becomes almost zero. By adding specific market requirements we increase the 
constraints and the risk of failure to find common challenge. It is shown that even formulated 
theoretically, common challenge strategy appears to be quite risky and difficult to succeed 
and requires particular expertise in both technology and marketing. Besides, the more 
classical strategy that leads to project exploration to formulate platform core appears to be 
risky as well. First of all, high level of uncertainty in the phase of project selection (subjective 
probability of success that changes over time), can lead to develop project that will not be 
suitable for being platform core. Second, it is not certain that the knowledge created during 
the project exploration can be reused in the phase of derivatives development. The strategy of 
project has a tendency to reduce the exploration space by formulating the context. Thus, we 
attempt to compare these two strategies by first, formally describing each strategy and 
fabricating simple economical model to compare these strategies. We will evaluate our model 
based on the exploration of innovative technology development in STMicroelectronics. 
The paper is organized as following. First, we present existing risk management strategies 
based on literature review and define strategies suitable for platform emergence management 
in double unknown situations. Second, we present chosen research methodology. Third, using 
proposed framework, we formally describe each strategy to be able to compare them and 
highlight the differences. We create a simulation model that leads us to define the principles 
of technical compatibility and markets compatibility to enable the choice in between 
strategies. We describe briefly the context of empirical study and we illustrate singular project 
and common challenge strategies using the chosen case study of advanced technology 
platform development. Finally, the paper closes with managerial implications of platform 
emergence strategies and directions for further research. 
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Literature review and Problem Formulation 
In this paper we deal with the management strategies in high uncertainty environment. 
Uncertainty is defined as a condition when decision maker doesn’t know all the alternatives, 
there are risks associated with each alternatives or the consequence (Griffin, 2004). Under 
uncertainty little is known related to the list of alternatives or the outcomes, the probabilities 
associated with the state of nature are unknown (Agbadudu 1996). The economic success is 
influenced by many uncertain exogenous and endogenous factors. The future profitability 
depends as well on how the decision makers manage the projects after they start and it is well 
demonstrated in the literature that continuous uncertainty management is required for 
innovative projects (Loch et al., 2006). Literature review on risk management allowed 
identifying two types of strategies, which have a tendency to manage uncertainties at the level 
of projects or portfolios (platforms). 
(Sanchez et al., 2009) showed that project risk management is a well developed domain in 
comparison to the program risk management and portfolio risk management fields. They 
stated that for portfolio management it is hard to find particular written methodologies. In 
portfolios usually we pilot risks case by case without considering influence of project 
dependencies in overall portfolio performance. The risk management methods based on 
uncertainty reduction for identified projects are well represented (a lot of work deals with 
studies on how decision makers cope with uncertainties (i.e., Lipchitz and Strauss, 1997; 
Chapman, 1990; projects with variations and foreseeable uncertainties in De Meyer et al., 
2002), etc.). Risk management includes techniques to either increase probability of 
occurrence of an event or increase its impact on the project (or decrease in case of negative 
risks) (Petit, 2011). These strategies lead to minimize unknown by selecting a priori the less 
uncertain projects with higher probability of occurrence, depending on the identified market 
risks and technological risk. The level of uncertainty allows prioritizing corresponding 
markets (based on market probability) and selects a project associated with maximal 
economic performance (i.e., Expected NPV, Discounted Cash Flow). The risk management is 
concentrated on addressing uncertainties associated with project feasibility, market, 
technology, financial aspects, organizational, etc. (Ward and Chapman, 2003). On the level of 
project there is a tradition of uncertainty diagnosis and risk reduction for pre-defined problem 
(S1). S1 lead to minimize unknown by selecting a priori the less uncertain projects, depending 
on the identified market risks and technological risk. The criterion of “good” risk 
management is the high probability of success of the project. These strategies deal with 
projects independently and do not consider existence of common knowledge. 
Risk management strategies in portfolio (S2) try to take into account common aspects in 
between projects. The example of this is a portfolio represented by a technological platform 
core and its derivatives. This second family of strategies take advantages of interdependencies 
in between projects. For instance, in case of modularization (Baldwin and Clark 1997, 2004) 
propose to reuse the platform core that helps to address various options that are depending on 
it. (Baldwin and Clark, 2004) showed how to obtain several available options thanks to 
common platform. Platforms represent a core of technological system and have to be 
interdependent with other parts of the system (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). According to 
platforms typology (Gawer 2010), we deal with internal, inside firm platforms in this paper. 
Reusing platform core attempts to minimize risks by constructing several options (Baldwin 
and Clark, 2004) (S2). The module considered to be defined once the market signal is 
sufficient enough to conceive it (Baldwin 2008, Baldwin and Clark, 1997, O’Connor et al., 
2008, Gawer and Cusumano, 2008, etc.)) (S2). This strategy increases chances to succeed not 
by selecting one single, most probable project but by increasing the size of the sample, i.e. by 
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being able to play several options, maximizing the total economic value of the portfolio of 
derivatives. Risks are managed by the portfolio manager or the platform manager. The 
criterion of “good” risk management is the aggregated profitability of the portfolio (or 
platform). This strategy works on common, but it is limited to common already known 
aspects in between projects.  
For more information about theoretical description of these two strategies see (Kokshagina et 
al., 2012). As was shown in the paper when it comes to highly uncertain situations 
(breakthrough, radical, disruptive, major innovation, etc.), S1 might be impossible, because all 
projects are too risky. One still could make hypothesis (in case of unforeseeable uncertainty 
(De Meyer et al, 2002)) based on subjective probabilities of success, but they change 
significantly at the end of projects. S2 strategy might be impossible because there is no 
platform available to play several times with limited costs in high uncertainty. In addition, 
existing literature on product platforms assumes that the platform leader knows the final use 
of products and is capable to develop these new products (Gawer, 2010). This is definitely not 
the case in the context of radical innovation when both the selection of platform core and final 
products use are highly uncertain.  
A lot of researchers propose the way to deal with high uncertainty (“unk unks”, unforeseeable 
uncertainty, etc.). (Loch et al., 2008) provide an overview of existing strategies to unknown 
management. By showing that traditional risk planning techniques are insufficient for 
management of unforeseeable uncertainty, they suggested that the final method depends on 
the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty and complexity of the problem. Their work 
proposed a complementary model for diagnosis of unforeseeable uncertainty by learning 
problem structure and decomposing the problem. This research summarized two fundamental 
approaches for management of uncertainty:  
• Trial and learning approach (Pitch et al. 2002, Van de Ven et al. 1999; Lynn et al. 
1998) that consists in iterative trying of selected trials and flexible changes in the 
course of action 
• Selectionism (Lenfle, 2011, Pitch et al., 2002, McGrath, 2001) consists of launching 
multiple trials in parallel and then selecting the best approach later. Selectionism is 
often considered to be more expensive and is affordable to use for big problems. 
Usually selectionism is less time consuming than trial and learning and more suitable 
for market driven approaches that need faster response.  
In the situation of high uncertainty and low complexity they suggested to use trial and 
learning approach and in both high uncertainty and complexity - combination of trial and 
learning and selectionism (Loch et al., 2008). In (Kokshagina et al. 2012) is shown that both 
these approaches lead to fabricate trial project to create knowledge that attempts to reduce 
uncertainty and identify alternatives. This lead to risk management first at the level of project 
and consequently at the level of portfolio once the trial project results in platform core. So we 
acquire common core as a result of uncertain projects exploration that attempts to find a 
solution for a particular identified challenge. The developed common core serves as a basis of 
successive explorations. We call this strategy singular challenge platform emergence (Sp). 
Empirically (Loch et al. 2008) used combination of trial and learning and selectionism 
method of launching parallel trials in application to the case of Escend Technology start-up. 
(Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995) showed how generational platforms were able to coexist 
within the Walkman product family consequently (project exploration) and support the 
development of important sub-families platform derivatives).  
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In (Kokshagina et al., 2012) the second type of strategy that deals with double unknown 
situations was introduced. This strategy doesn’t attempt to obtain common core as a result of 
exploration, but works directly with “common challenge” as an object to conceive and 
manage (Sc). The common unknown is precisely the common challenge for several identified 
market options. In common challenge strategy there is a tendency to pay exploration phases 
that allows designing common core fabricated to emerging market derivatives. Common 
challenge strategy to pilot risks was introduced based on the literature review and its 
application was illustrated on empirical case of technology development in 
STMicroelectronics. This strategy doesn’t deal with the same object, uses different resources 
and require particular conditions to its implementation. The actors responsible for its 
management have to take into account both technical challenges and emerging market needs 
and have a competence to connect them to create common core. Even if identified based on 
literature review, common challenge strategy is not widely used in practise since it is 
considered to be expensive, risky and hard to manage due to several reasons. Among them: 
1. The capability to identify potential market derivatives in the case of double unknown. 
It is considered to be highly uncertain to already predefine the list emerging markets. 
2. The capability to identify common challenge to several potential markets and 
construct common core. 
3. The cost of adaptation of common unknown to address particular market options has 
to be relatively small to assure the profitability of the overall portfolio to justify 
preliminary investment for common core construction. 
Thus, common challenge strategy creates particular condition for its implementation and in 
practice the tendency is to select less risky development of exploration projects type Sp. 
Nevertheless, the more classical Sp strategy that leads to project exploration to formulate 
platform core appears to be risky as well. First of all, high level of uncertainty in the phase of 
project selection (subjective probability of success that changes over time), can lead to 
develop project that will not be suitable for being platform core and address already identified 
market. Studies of new industrial product failures consistently show that selection of 
inadequate market knowledge, brought about partially by ineffective market research, is a key 
contributor to the failure of project exploration (Maidique and Zirger 1984). Second, it is not 
certain that the knowledge created during the project exploration can be reused in the phase of 
derivatives development.  
Therefore it is not evident which strategy is more advantageous for innovative technology 
platform development in double unknown. The objective of the paper is to precise what are 
the exact situations that make possible the identified strategies in double unknown, what are 
their limits and advantages. We attempt to define what are the precise market and 
technological conditions that in certain situations lead to develop common building block 
(common core) that facilitate all the others projects but don’t provide access directly to the 
market. 
To address our research questions, we attempt to define necessary criteria and resources to 
model each strategy, to characterize identified strategies and investigate applicability of risk 
management strategies in double unknown. Analytical model will allows us to understand the 
logic behind each strategy, its consistency and interest of each strategy in practice. We 
provide simplified model to compare identified strategies on an empirical case of 
BICMOSMW technological platform development in STMicroelectronics. 
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Methodology 
The objective is to analyze the precise market and technological conditions that in certain 
situations lead to platform emergence based on singular challenge project exploration or 
common to several markets challenge identification. We propose a simple economical model 
to characterize identified risk management strategies. There are various ways to model risk 
management strategies behaviour. The goal for our model is not to explicitly model each 
strategy but to show in general the difference in between them, to show to which extend each 
strategy can be implemented in practise.  
To explore the proposed model utility we carried out a field study in semiconductor silicon 
foundry and analyzed an empirical case of technological platform development to compare 
identified strategies. For this empirical study the primary source of data were regular and 
frequent semi-structured interviews. This work was conducted over 8 months period from 
(November 2010 – June 2011). This case of technology development implied portfolio of 
Collaborative R&D projects, PhD thesis, and business unit development projects. We 
organized interviews specialists participating or leading technology development from R&D 
technology and design groups, business divisions, former PhD students and some associated 
external research centres. Overall around 20 interviews were performed. The analysis was 
completed by the scope of documents as European projects reports, research presentations, 
and thesis manuscripts, database of thesis project descriptions. In addition, data analysis was 
followed by seminars with company managers (not necessary participating in technology 
development) to discuss the project, to test the validity of our hypothesis and enrich our 
propositions. 
Comparative case study 
We conduct our case study at STMicroelectronics, one of the leading semiconductor 
companies, in Advanced R&D research units that don’t follow classical rules of R&D 
Management. The relevance of semiconductor industry for radical innovation studies was 
showed by various researchers (ex., Cohen, Levinthan, 1989), especially for knowledge 
creation methods in science-based environments (showed by Le Masson, et al. 2010, 2012) 
driven by “More Moore” Law (Moore, 1965). Strong competition, fast changing environment 
relevant to semiconductor industry lead it to explore not just new technologies, but as well 
new functionalities, creating new products.  Advanced R&D units in STM don’t follow 
“More Moore” law. They are subscribed in diversification approach that is identified by ITRS 
as “More than Moore” (ITRS 2007).  There is neither clear scientific question, neither well 
defined decision to develop new products based on exploration and targeted markets. There is 
high level of uncertainty both on the level of technology and future markets. 
To better understand the applicability of Sp and Sc strategies in double unknown platforms we 
illustrate their application on the case study of advanced technology platform development 
(Leguay et al., 2011). The studied case is BICMOSMW (high performance 0.13!m SiGe 
BiCMOS technology, targeting very high-frequency applications) technology platform 
development based on Heterojunction Bipolar transistor (HBT) with unique technology 
features. Despite of the difficulties in defining both future technology and designing market, 
the team succeeded to address several markets simultaneously. The choice of this case to 
compare both strategies is based on the differences identified through case studies interviews. 
First group of interviewers were presenting the case as management of exploration project of 
BISMOSMW technological brick development for radar application development and its 
reintegration for fast download and optical communication in the following steps. The experts 
who were responsible for the technology design and management showed that it was not 
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executed completely neither at the level of project based strategy, nor at the level of portfolio 
based. The team leader based the platform exploration in addressing what was unknown for 
all the targeted markets; he was seeking for common challenge. The dependences were 
constructed based on common challenge identification (Sc) and were managed based on the 
links to allow exploration. These differences in case treatment lead us to apply our analytical 
model using both strategies to BICMOSMW case of technology development. We will further 
describe the case, identify which logic the technology development followed and compare 
performance of different strategies.  
Framework introduction 
To propose analytical model for project driven singular challenge Sp or common challenge 
strategy SC, we start by characterising the classical S1 and S2 strategies. Risk management 
strategies deal with both market and technology uncertainty (Abernathy and Clark 1985). 
Market uncertainty is based on the volatility of market size, customer needs. Technology 
uncertainty concerns the volatility of available knowledge and field set (Oriani and Sobrero 
2001).  
Risk minimization at the level of projects – S1 
These strategies lead to minimize unknown by selecting a priori the less uncertain dominant 
projects from the list of identified candidates P1,..Pi, depending on the identified market risks 
and technological risk. The level of uncertainty allows prioritizing corresponding markets 
(there is probability distribution for list of markets): M1,.., Mn  - list of predefined markets 
P1,.., Pn  - list of corresponding probability of success for each market accordingly: P1(M1),.., Pn 
(Mn). Marketing is able to prioritize market and predefine a dominant market to address with 
associated project definition: functions; targeted clients, technical specification. 
Cost of the projects exploration: C1,.., Cn. Cost of exploration of each project is high and with 
defined budget one can pay only one project. We consider that the cost of projects exploration 
is limited by predefined budget of R&D (B). So C1,.., Cn ~ B. The budget of a project is 
predefined (usually R&D budget for project development) and we consider that selected 
project Pi will not overcome it. ! is expected profit.  
The expected benefits are determined on the basis of estimated a priori subjective probability 
function. The probabilities are regarded as being subjective which helps to avoid restriction in 
business decision making (Joseph 2010). The expected value is the weighted average and is 
found by multiplying each expected net present value (ENPV) by its respective probability. 
The decision maker has to select the dominant project from different candidates that can have 
similar or different net present value and with different probability distributions (by using a 
normalized measure of a dispersion of probability distribution). Therefore, one has to weight 
the alternatives and determine the one more feasible. 
We select project i based on prioritized candidates list based on the ratio of the standard 
deviation and mean of expected value. The expected value of each project is calculated based 
on: , where . 
The criterion of “good” risk management is the high probability of success of the project and 
minimum coefficient of variation for project with controlled budget. The coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation divided by expected value) is used to measure risks while 
comparing alternative projects. The higher the coefficient of variation, the riskier is the 
project. The risk management is concentrated on addressing uncertainties associated with 
The R&D Management Conference 2012 
 10 
project feasibility, market, etc. Risks in S1 should be managed by the project leaders that are 
capable to define and calculate information based on probability of success of different 
solutions, to reason based on both technical and market planning. The resources needed for 
project risk management is information based on functionality of the project, future users, and 
technical principles. 
 Risk minimization at the level of portfolio – S2  
Risk minimization at the level of portfolio consists in using an existing platform core 
(minimal system) to construct several options (S2). This strategy increases chances to succeed 
not by selecting one single, most probable project but by increasing the size of the sample, i.e. 
by being able to play several options, maximizing the total economic value of the portfolio of 
derivatives. Risks are managed by the portfolio or platform manager. The criterion of “good” 
risk management is the aggregated profitability of the portfolio (or platform).  
In platform driven strategy, platform core is considered to be predefined - Pof. In (Baldwin 
and Clark, 2004) the total economic value of the system is expressed as the sum of minimal 
given value (platform core in S2) plus the incremental value added by each module. 
The objective is to construct market derivatives that are based on Pof.. Strategy responsible has 
to select a platform core from the list of given already (identified) potentially candidates. In 
the case of S2 we can have several cores and take the one that aggregates better: the choice in 
between platforms.  
There exist a list of modules with equal rather low probability (not possible to select dominant 
project), so one can play several options. Predefine probabilities of market derivatives are 
normally low and therefore they are not interesting for S1 strategy P1,..,Pn  <1 (low probability 
equal for different derivatives; where n – number of project derivatives) that are derivatives of 
our platform (can’t make a prioritized list) with associated market derivatives: M1,.., Mn . 
Aggregated cost value of market derivatives development has to be slightly low and reuse 
maximally already existing platform core. Each option attempts to address different market 
derivative maximizing the total economic value of the portfolio of derivatives. The constraint 
is defined by budget:  " Ci ~B 
The Expected value of the system is the expected aggregated profitability of the portfolio (or 
platform). 
 
We suggest than in the case of low probability of n market derivatives, we can consider them 
more or less equal: ~p. Portfolio manager has to know well the platform to identify 
derivatives. He has to manage the portfolio of options and probability that the set of chosen 
options is profitable. The information needed for platform driven strategy is based on 
platform core and cost of options. 
As was stated before in the situation of radical innovations one can’t predefine dominant 
market in S1 and it is impossible to predefine platform in S2 to address platform derivatives. 
The literature leads to identify SP strategy that starts as project driven and then attempts to 
reuse identified projects as a platform core.  
SP: Singular challenge – Platform emergence strategy 
Traditional risk management criteria like (Discounted Cash Flow, Internal Rate of Return, 
Cost-Benefit Ratio, etc.) assume the predefined value of uncertainty over the course of 
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projects development, and thus, don’t consider flexibility necessary for projects in double 
unknown. In the situation of radical innovation we can’t select a market with higher 
probability and implement S1 strategy. As well, we don’t have platform core to address all 
these markets with equally flat probabilities distribution.  
When the payoffs (future benefits) and costs are uncertain, one will have chance node that 
reflect two or more probabilistic payoffs and cost scenarios. This implies that the distribution 
of costs (Ci) and future benefits will have a non-zero variance. To reflect managerial 
flexibility, one could embody decision nodes that enable management to eliminate poor 
alternatives to avoid bad outcomes. The uncertainty affects the expected investments values 
by widening the distributions (Benaroch, 2002). Thus, the market probability distribution in 
the high uncertainty situations are considered almost flat and in the first phase of SP is hard to 
prioritize markets. We consider that it is still possible to prescribe subjective probabilities in 
order not to select dominant market but estimate which of them can be less risky and more 
accessible for future derivates in options construction after. Therefore we select less risky 
project based on coefficient of variation of expected project value: 
,  where  
It is important to mention that at the beginning of Sp we are not able to identify future 
common core for portfolio construction. The project exploration results in platform core 
construction. We complete this strategy by the second phase of options exploration with 
identified market derivatives: M’1,.., M’n . Project P1 developed in the first phase is becoming a 
platform core P1 = P0PF that makes accessible low probability markets in the second phase. 
The knowledge created in the first phase attempts to decrease uncertainty relevant to other 
projects. The total expected value of this strategy is the sum of the expected value of the first 
exploration project and aggregated expected value of project derivatives. 
, 
where aggregated value contains the value of both exploration project and market derivatives. 
The risk management in this combined strategy depends mostly on good exploration of 
project in the first phase. Platform core selection is limited to first developed project and its 
flexibility for identified future options. In SP we assume several risks: we accumulate 
uncertainty relative to project selection and developing platform core and risks associated to 
derivatives management. In addition, there is a risk that the chosen project will not result in 
the platform accessible to market options. For project manager in SP there are the same risks 
as in S1, just it is much more challenging to identify exploration project in high uncertainty. 
Regarding cost of exploration, there is a high uncertainty in budget required for the second 
phase based on how well the exploration was identified and managed. If project gives a 
platform accessible for already identified options, portfolio manager has competence to pilot 
proposed platform core and associate it with valuable options, otherwise the necessity to adapt 
system could lead to expensive development. 
SC: common challenge 
The major difference of SC in comparison with other strategies is that we deal not with 
existing object but with a concept of common challenge. Instead of starting with project 
exploration to reuse maximum known, we start directly with platform identification as 
common challenge to several market derivatives. As we saw in previous research there are 
situations (in emerging fields), when it is possible to identify dependencies in between 
emerging future markets and construct common core in between them. These dependencies 
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are based on market and technology to identify common challenge. We characterize market 
interdependencies as common functional characteristics for set of various markets.  
The logic of common challenge is to fabricate common core for the list of potential market 
candidates with low probability. We consider the set of potential markets M1,.., Mn. Then 
common challenge is a technological building block to addresses certain specific functions 
common to the set of identified markets.  
The risk management criteria based on uncertainty reduction (max value with min deviation) 
is not explicit for common core strategy. We are dealing with exploration space where it is 
impossible to highlight probabilities for markets and technologies that don’t exist yet. Instead, 
we are increasing the variety of options to play. We construct common core based on 
common dependent elements between emerging markets. These dependent elements are 
common functional challenges for set of various markets. In this strategy we launch a 
preliminary phase of common challenge identification that will address all the identified 
options. There is a preliminary cost of paying PO projects that significantly reduce the cost of 
each option development. 
We maximize the variability of options to play later. By introducing SC  strategy, we found 
out that for good risk management in double unknown it is necessary not just to minimize 
uncertainties for selected exploration space, but also to maximize the variability of future 
options. There is certainly risk associated to common challenge identification. The total 
expected value of the platform developed:  
, where  
The aggregated cost of development of all the alternatives and cost of common challenge 
exploration should be inferior to budget of R&D. Further we illustrate singular challenge Sp 
and common challenge Sc strategies using empirical material to highlight the major 
differences, specifics and prerequisites to launch these strategies. 
Empirical Data 
Case description BiCMOSMW platform development 
We illustrate the identified risk management strategies on BiCMOSMW (high performance 
0.13!m SiGe BiCMOS technology, targeting very high-frequency applications) technology 
platform development (Chantre et al., 2010). (Chevalier, 2007) showed that high-speed 
BiCMOS roadmap is driven, on one hand by the increase of the optical communications data 
rate, and on the other hand by the emergence of applications at higher frequencies. It doesn’t 
follow classical More Moore law. Si/SiGeC heterogeneous bipolar transistor (HBT) 
performances can be pushed forward (with significant advantages over CMOS) and 
applications at ever increasing frequencies carry on.  
In STMicroelectronics, BISMOSMW platform has evolved after several generations of 
technical solutions. Started with BiPx project it leads to BICMOSMW (specifically designed 
to address emerging millimeter-wave applications) and beyond. The history of bipolar 
transistor technology based on SiGe in STMicroelectronics started in 1998 with 0.35 µm 
technology for wireless communication (Geynet, 2008). The success of the SiGe HBT has 
come from its compatibility with silicon technology allowing both low-cost and high yield. 
While bipolar-only technologies are attractive to replace III-V technologies; full benefit is 
obtained by using heterogeneous solution of BiCMOS + CMOS devices. In spite of the ever-
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increasing constraints brought about by integration with CMOS (thermal budget, structural 
issues, etc.), HBT performance was dramatically increased over the past 10 years.  
Till 2002 the group was working on optimization of bipolar transistor for analog signal 
processing to address emerging standard of 60GHz. There was no particular client demand at 
the beginning. The technological basis that was developed was not ready to address any 
market that time and the key technology was based on CMOS. In the following 2002 the 
group was analyzing which potential high-volume market and technological effort needed to 
develop to address it while reusing the previous research results on bipolar transistor.  
The expert (Technology Line Manager) that initiated technology development was looking 
for an emerging market with potentially huge volume to assure return on investment. He 
identified a particular system issue: the Wi-Fi connections in the big public systems like 
airports, train stations, and more generally high-density places with a lot of connectivity 
devices. The current issue was with the standard for Wi-Fi communication (2.5 to 5 GHz), the 
frequency of processing information was too low to ensure connectivity substantial debit to 
each device. Thus, one potential solution was to use a 60GHz Wi-Fi system with a long range 
(>10m) to limit the number of base stations and system complexity.  Functional requirements 
of the identified system contained both high-frequency emissions that were addresses by 
developed BICMOSMW technology that helped to combine different functional requirements 
as low power consumption, digital signal treatment, covered distance, etc. They used this 
knowledge to address automotive radar, optical communications, wireless fast download 
systems, high speed instrumentation, non invasive imaging and standard linear products 
identified market derivatives. In the following we attempt to use this briefly described case to 
show the potential outcomes of technology developed treated either by project singular 
challenge strategy or common challenge strategy.  
Illustration with case study 
We consider that each market follows normal probability distribution (evaluation of mean and 
standard value) to show the evolution of market probability distribution in the course of 
technology development. At the beginning in double unknown all the distribution curves are 
flat. To simplify the calculation we use discrete probabilities Pi and we suppose that all the 
market have the same volume V. 
Initially 6 potential markets were identified with associated probability distribution for 
BISMOSMW. As uncertain emerging markets in this paper we consider existing markets with 
added new functionalities (new products) or completely new markets: M1: radar (automotive 
market); M2 : optical communication; M3 : standard linear products; M4: medical ; M5 : hard 
disk drive applications; M6 : fast download (figure 1, each project addressed each market 
accordingly). 
We suppose the cost of development for technology for each market is equal to Ci (Ci=150).  
Here the cost of development is the cost of technological building block development only. At 
the level of market division there is no difference in between BICMOSMW technology 
prototype for radar application or for Wi-Fi for airport since both technologies are using 
similar phenomena. The tests, package types, interconnections, mode of implementation, etc. 
are always necessary for final product development and they don’t vary significantly with the 
features of technical core. So we don’t take these costs into account (they are inevitable for 
product development). The defined budget of R&D for technology platform development is 
B=250.  
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Figure 1 Initial situation for identified projects (Expected value distribution and Development cost 
for identified projects) 
Singular challenge – Platform emergence strategy Sp 
As we are in the situation of high uncertainty all the markets have really low probability and 
high volatility (figure 1). The markets probability distributions are almost identical. 
Therefore, it is hard to select one most promising project. Nevertheless, market analysis 
showed that the radar application was more certain and the team start to explore potential 
bipolar technology targeting automotive market. By decomposing the projects, they defined 
functional requirements (FRs) relatively to the automotive market: low consumption, high 
frequency, cover long distance, integrated solution (CMOS+bipolar). The cost to develop first 
project was determined as C1= 150. We consider that in the course of development, there is a 
chance that the project launched will minimize the cost of development of other dependent 
projects. We fabricate common core (figure 2). Once the technology developed, there are two 
scenarios possible. 
Scenario 1. Technology developed in the first phase of Sp allows decreasing uncertainty 
relatively to other projects.  
For example, high frequency of operation and low consumption of technology developed for 
automotive industry are relevant to optical communication and fast-download system as well. 
So the exploration project decreases significantly uncertainty relevant to the 2 and 6 projects. 
The challenge is that the cost of development for identified derivatives 2 and 6 should be 
. With the B = 250 and C1=150. The C2+C3=100. For the budget that rests, 
one can develop derivatives project 2 and 6. The existing bipolar solution was not able to 
achieve desired for optical communication speed 100GB/s. For project 2 of optical 
communication the new function relatively to already developed in the first phase of Sp was to 
ensure high voltage capability for optical communication and low noise. So the team had to 
redesign the system developed in S1’ to adapt it to the new market with the cost of 
exploration C2. For fast download (project 6) one had to ensure emerging 60GHz standard 
with assigned cost of adaptation – C6. In the second phase, the situation described is presented 
in the (figure 3, left).  
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Figure 2 Technology platform developed followed by Sp strategy 
Scenario 2. Technology developed in the first phase of Sp didn’t allow decreasing uncertainty 
for other potential market derivatives.  
This is the extreme case when technology explored for radar communication was specifically 
oriented to automotive industry. Therefore, the level of integration of developed technology 
and knowledge created during project exploration were not relevant to any of other options 
identified. In this case, the level of uncertainty relative to other options after radar application 
development doesn’t change and therefore the cost of development remains the same. The 
project fails to form a platform core since the exploration space was restricted by problem 
setting in the first place. Project derivatives can’t reuse knowledge created to decrease 
uncertainty and the cost of adaptation is still high (figure 3, on the right). 
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Figure 3. Second phase of Sp strategy after project exploration. 1. Expected value distribution and 
development cost for platform core (positive scenario) 2. Negative scenario (right). 
Common challenge SC 
We consider the same identified markets as in Sp, the same costs at the beginning. But there is 
an expert that proposes a project of technological development common to all identified 
markets P0. Common base to 6 markets in this case is precisely common challenge. But if 
identified P0 works, we arrive to decrease the cost sufficiently. In this case there is a 
possibility that there is a common core which is not known a priori but its creation provokes 
significant minimization of the cost for other projects – common challenge. In this example 
common challenge is the Wi-Fi system at the airport. The technological phenomena 
developed addresses maximum functions with the particular budget associated to access all 
the defined markets. The developed technology BICMOSMW allowed to explore maximum 
functions with fixed budget of R&D and addresses several markets at the same time. 
Common challenge was identified as knowledge gap that would connect knowledge related 
to functions of the future system (figure 4).  
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Figure 4 Technology platform development followed common challenge strategy Sc 
For Common challenge strategy to work one needs to identify common challenge and invest 
in one technology that will decrease the cost of development for all identified markets. On the 
contrary to previous strategy, at the end of common core development the probability 
distribution doesn’t change significantly but the cost of research decreases sufficiently for 
each market (figure 5). Suppose that B = 250. If the cost of development for P0 project: 
C1=190. B-CP0>="CPi. By developing the common core that was precisely BICMOSMW for 
WIFI airport system, we decrease the cost sufficiently and develop other options with the rest 
of the budget (fig. below).  
 
Figure 5 Expected value and development cost distribution after common core construction 
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Discussion 
Based on the proposed simplified models we see that the success of both strategies depend on 
the first project selection in Sp and Common challenge SC identification P0 in the second 
strategy. Through the simple models: 
1. We’ve noticed that it is necessary to compare the probability of success of technical 
development of common challenge to the probability of the first exploration project. 
Does the success of the strategies depend on the probability of PS1 and P0? 
2. We saw in the second strategy that the success of the strategy depends on the effect of 
project P0 to the cost decrease for projects P1,..,P6. There is a gain on the cost of 
development thanks to P0, but ad hoc we have to minimize risks. While launching 
common challenge strategy, we don’t have to look for P0 with minimum cost of 
development, but rather P0 that allows developing all the modules with the cost 
inferior to the budget. So we need to find common challenge which ensure the 
aggregated cost of modules development and common challenge exploration is 
inferior to predefined budget of R&D.  
We formulate the law of interdependency to construct common challenge for various 
alternatives. Normally the more alternatives we have, the less is probability of common 
challenge identification. It means that the probability to address N markets ~1/N. To construct 
common core we attempt to predefine future links in between different market functions. The 
complexity works on the number of links in between these functions. For example, for 2 
markets we can have one link, for 4 markets – 6 links. We suppose the connections in 
between markets can be developed with likelihood costs. If we consider new market for 
common challenge strategy, we need to validate if it is compatible with all the others markets. 
Number of compatibilities to ensure in between different markets: for 2 markets – 1 link of 
compatibility, for 3 markets - 3, for 4 – 6 links, etc. For k markets, the probability of market k 
to be compatible with the others is equal to . The more alternatives we have the less is 
probability. In this case, one would never find common core in between several potential 
markets due to extremely low probability if existence.  
Based on the case study, we suppose that the success of common core strategy doesn’t depend 
on the number of identified markets. In the case of common unknown  . 
For instance, the probability that we find unique BISMOSMW for 6 markets or 2 markets is 
the same and equal to . Thus, we formulate the law of market compatibility  
where  common core probability and p – probability of all the links to ensure for k markets. 
Suppose the probability that we common core has a high level of compatible with the markets 
p~1 because technology that targets high frequency is used by all identified markets. In this 
case  . Thus, normally we don’t launch common challenge strategy because 
probability to connect N markets is almost zero and cost of compatibility to ensure is 
considered to be high. We show that the common challenge is possible when compatibility of 
common core is high for all the identified markets. It means the probability of being capable 
to develop the links is high. So we formulate:  
The law of market compatibility: the probability of common challenge existence doesn’t 
depend on the number of alternatives; but on high probability of compatibility in between 
markets. , when p~1   for common challenge. 
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The second challenge for technology development in high uncertainty is to keep the 
development cost under budget constraints. We need to explain the structure of the cost. At 
the beginning of development there is an initial knowledge base K0. In the Sp strategies the 
trajectories of projects development are independent at the beginning. When we develop first 
exploration project there is a possibility that we decrease the cost of development for other 
projects. Thus, in the second phase of Sp, trajectories (due to minimized uncertainties and 
knowledge reuse) can be shorter or don’t change depending on the results of first phase 
exploration (figure 6). In the figure, the P1 project launched in first phase decreases the cost of 
the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 projects (trajectory in red). 
While starting technology development, we don’t usually look for P0 project that is certainly 
longer then P1 and cost of CP0 is superior to the cost of P1, but we prefer to develop market 
that is certain to pay. However, once if we find P0 project that allows decreasing uncertainties 
common to other projects, we are much closer to identified markets, trajectories for all the 
options are much shorter (figure 6). In this common challenge strategy there is preliminary 
cost CP0 for common core developing, but it allows obtaining the cost of adaptation " that is 
significantly smaller than the cost of development of each of these alternatives Ci: 
 (trajectory in green; figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 Project trajectories emergence 
Thus, we formulate the law of technology compatibility: one can pay technological common 
core development if it allows addressing all the identified options with the cost inferior to 
budget of R&D  
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How can we ensure costs of technology adaptation to be low? We can guarantee costs to be 
low if there is a high level of compatibility between markets and we attempt to share 
knowledge among them. Launching development project by project, we don’t seek for 
connections in between these projects since there a lot of potential alternatives for each 
market and we can result in developing different technologies for each of the market. While 
developing one project, the purpose is to develop the technology that pays right away for 
identified market, and not the one that has potential to connect several ones. 
Certainly on the level of mature project development and established markets, one would not 
look for technology and market compatibilities. However, in the early phases of technology 
investigation in double unknown, one could play potential market compatibilities with related 
technological functions. To common challenge strategy to function, there should be a lot of 
different applications, alternatives using similar technological phenomena. For example for 
the automobile industry, the number of alternatives is restricted to particular geographical 
regions, different economy, production is integrated and most probably common challenge 
strategy is impossible to exist. On the contrary, the enormous amount of technological 
alternatives and modularity in semiconductor industry makes common challenge strategy 
particularly interesting. 
Results 
This paper contributes to the literature in technological platform emergence in the double 
unknown situation when technology and markets are highly uncertain, neither platform core, 
nor options are known. We have compared two possible strategies of platform emergence in 
double unknown:  
1. Project emergence first to find solution to the singular challenge market challenge 
and then formulate the platform based on this project to launch platform 
derivatives – “Singular challenge” 
2. Platform emergence first to find solution to identified common challenge relative 
to potential options and then adapting design platform core to these market 
derivatives – “Common challenge”. In this strategy common core doesn’t exist at 
the beginning of the exploration. 
This paper allowed determining the situations when common challenge strategy that is usually 
expensive, risky and hard to manage is attractive. We characterized what are the markets and 
technological conditions that in certain situations allowed developing technology core to 
support the others (common challenge) but don’t access directly to the market. We showed 
that it is possible in certain conditions of cost structure and probability of market existence by 
introducing two laws of technology and market compatibility for common challenge strategy. 
Law of market compatibility: probability of common challenge existence P0 doesn’t depend 
on the number of alternatives; but on high probability of compatibility in between markets. 
, when p~1   for common challenge, k – number of markets. 
Law of technology compatibility: one pays the technological common core development CP0 
if it allows addressing all the identified options P1,..,PN with the aggregated cost CPi inferior 
to budget of R&D , where " – the decreased cost of market 
options developed after common core exploration. 
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While guarantee these two conditions, one can rely on common challenge strategy to exist 
when all the markets have equally flat probability of distribution in double unknown. If one of 
the markets is potentially better and there are dependent markets that potentially can reuse the 
technology developed to this singular market, the singular challenge platform emergence 
strategy is more attractive.  
Using the introduced rules of technology and market compatibility, one can test whether 
common challenge is applicable in each particular case. However, proposed framework is 
static. Introducing important strategies of risk management in highly uncertain situations and 
conditions if their implementation, we haven’t yet taken into account dynamic in different 
sectors. The further work relative to technology transfers and market emergence will need to 
investigate which strategy one has to adopt according to the markets and technologies 
dynamics. The model will integrate the emergence of new markets in the form of new 
functions combination and modelling of existing and emerging technologies in the form of 
graph related entities.  
In the proposed work, we didn’t take into account the competition dynamics in between 
different markets and other industrial actors. More investigation is necessary to understand 
competition dynamics influence and we will attempt to take it into account further. 
Conclusion and managerial implications 
The proposed study explores a gap in the literature relevant to the choice of platform 
emergence strategy in double unknown situation in between: 1) consequent emergence of 
project relatively to singular market challenge and then creating a platform core that address 
market derivatives based on that project and 2) platform design based on common challenge 
identification relevant to several markets. To investigate the question of market and 
technology conditions of each strategy implementation, we formulate a model that synthesise 
the description of each risk management strategy for platform emergence. Thanks to this 
model we introduced technology and market compatibility rules that highlight the situations 
when common challenge strategy is possible. We illustrated both strategies on the case 
advanced technology development in semiconductor industry and highlighted their limits. The 
proposed model is static and its objective is to understand major differences in between 
strategies behaviour relative to development costs and market probabilities. Further research 
will need to sophisticate our model to take into account specifics of real situations 
(competition, stochastic evaluation, etc.). This model will need to take into account dynamic 
of platform renewal and technology and markets emergence in the course of time. 
This paper contributes to existing work on platform emergence by introducing the strategy of 
platform core construction in double unknown based on future common challenge 
investigation. Based on the proposed framework, we introduced technology and market 
compatibility rules to formulate common challenge relevant to several markets considering 
the high probability of compatibility in between market derivatives and common challenge 
that decreases the cost of technology adaptation for identified options. Therefore, the common 
challenge strategy aims at knowledge creation, attempts to keep cost under control of R&D 
budget, while maximizing the likelihood of being relevant for future markets. 
In addition, our study shows that the strategy of singular challenge first project development 
for platform core emergence (SP) depends on the context of the first project setting. There is a 
negative effect that the results of project exploration can fail to decrease uncertainties relevant 
to other options.  
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As it has been shown, the common challenge strategy is relevant to the industries with 
different part of alternatives, mostly for upstream type of industries like semiconductor silicon 
foundries. Even if some academics and practitioners insist on independency of advanced 
research exploration from addressing concrete markets issues, our work suggest a managerial 
implications of strengthening the collaboration in between Technology R&D and markets 
divisions. This collaboration will allow the construction of flexible common challenges and 
enhance the value of common core relative to future market derivatives. However, the 
common challenge emergence has to be done in the earlier phases of technology exploration 
and market emergence (breakthrough innovations) to avoid too many constraints added by 
each market derivatives, because this will lead to rigid core construction and increase the cost 
of development. 
Finally, using originally new way of risk management based on knowledge gap identification 
to construct common core, company can build its innovative capabilities through knowledge 
management and better position to innovate in emerging fields.  
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